In re: Hollers

Appellate Case: 25-2073 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 08/15/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 15, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court In re: JOSHUA DANIEL HOLLERS, No. 25-2073 (D.C. No. 2:25-CV-00378-KWR-JHR) Petitioner. (D. N.M.) _________________________________

ORDER _________________________________

Before HARTZ, KELLY, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Joshua Daniel Hollers, proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of

mandamus. He requests a writ of mandamus directing the district court to rule on his

motions seeking post-judgment relief under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. See Pet. at 1, 4. But he also states that the district court “summarily denied”

and “blankly rejected” all of his post-judgment motions on June 30, 2025, and references

docket number 40. Id. at 2, 3. The district court docket sheet reflects that the court did

enter an order on June 30, 2025, at docket number 40, denying Hollers’s post-judgment

motions. Because the district court ruled on his Rule 60 motions, Hollers’s request for a

writ of mandamus directing the court to rule on those motions is moot. To the extent the

mandamus petition challenges how the district court ruled on the motions, mandamus

relief is unavailable because the district court’s order is appealable. See United States v.

Gundersen, 978 F.2d 580, 582 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[I]f appeal is available to petitioners as

a means of redress, their case is not appropriate for mandamus relief.”). Appellate Case: 25-2073 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 08/15/2025 Page: 2

We liberally construe the technical requirements of a notice of appeal to avoid

injustice and, for pro se litigants, accept various filings as the functional equivalent of a

notice of appeal. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1992). Hollers would be out

of time to file a notice of appeal if we simply denied his mandamus petition, and we have

previously construed a mandamus petition as a notice of appeal. See, e.g., Gundersen,

978 F.2d at 583-84. Because the mandamus petition contains the requisite information

for a notice of appeal set out in Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1), and because it was filed within

the time period specified in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), we will treat it as the functional

equivalent of a notice of appeal from the district court’s order entered June 30, 2025,

ECF No. 40, in District of New Mexico case number 2:25-cv-00378-KWR-JHR. See

Smith, 502 U.S. at 248-49 (“[T]he notice afforded by a document, not the litigant’s

motivation in filing it, determines the document’s sufficiency as a notice of appeal. If a

document filed within the time specified by Rule 4 gives the notice required by Rule 3, it

is effective as a notice of appeal.”). We direct the Clerk of the Court to treat Hollers’s

mandamus petition as a misdirected notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(d) and to

proceed accordingly.

We deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We grant Hollers’s motion to proceed

without prepayment of costs or fees, but we deny all other pending motions filed in this

matter.

Entered for the Court

CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk 2