United States v. Wilson, No. 90-1745 (U.S. 1992)

The holding, quoted from the court

It is the Attorney General who computes the amount of the § 3585(b) credit after the defendant has begun to serve his sentence. Pp. 331–337. (a) Effective in 1987, § 3585(b)—which specifies, inter alia, that “[a] defendant shall be given credit toward [his] term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences,” if such time “has not been credited against another sen- tence” (emphasis added)—replaced a statute which had provided, among other things, that “[t]he Attorney General shall give any such person credit” (emphasis added). Under the predecessor statute, the Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), computed the amount of credit after taking custody of the sentenced federal offender. Pp. 331–333. (b) Section 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute the credit at sentencing. By stating crucial verbs in the past and present perfect tenses, the section indicates that the computation must occur after the defendant begins his sentence. A sentencing court, therefore, cannot apply the section. Indeed, the District Court here could not have made the necessary computation at sentencing, since the credit is based on how much time a defendant “has spent” (not “will have spent”) prior to beginning his sentence. The court did not then know when the state-court proceedings would end or when the federal authorities would take Wilson into custody, and only could have speculated about the amount of time that he would spend in detention. Moreover, it is immaterial that such detention “ha[d] not been credited” against a state sentence at the time of Wilson’s federal sentencing, since basing the award of credit on the relative timing of sentencing proceedings would result in arbitrary awards. Pp. 333–334. 503us2$50z 02-19-99 09:45:35 PAGES OPINPGT 330 UNITED STATES v. WILSON Opinion of the Court (c) In light of the sentencing court’s inability to compute the credit, the Attorney General must continue to make the calculation as he did in the past, even though § 3585(b) no longer mentions him. The of- fender has a right to certain jail-time credit under the section, and BOP must know how much of a sentence remains in order to fulfill its statu- tory duty of administering the sentence. Congress’ conversion of the former statute’s active language into the passive voice in § 3585(b) is a slim ground for presuming an intention to change well-established procedures for determining the credit. Pp. 334–336. (d) The general presumption that Congress contemplates a change whenever it amends a statute is overcome in this case by the foregoing analysis. Because the statute was entirely rewritten, and because any other interpretation would require this Court to stretch § 3585(b)’s lan- guage, it is likely that the former reference to the Attorney General was simply lost in the shuffle. This interpretation does not render the 1987 revision meaningless, since Congress altered the predecessor statute in at least three other ways. Pp. 336–337. 916 F. 2d 1115, reversedReversedThe reviewing court overturned all or part of the lower decision.Learn more about reversed →. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinionDissenting opinionA separate opinion disagreeing with the court's result or reasoning.Learn more about dissenting opinion →, in which White, J., joined, post, p. 337. Amy L. Wax argued the cause for the United States. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assist- ant Attorney General Mueller, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and Joel M. Gershowitz. Henry A. Martin, by appointment of the Court, 502 U. S. 936, argued the cause for respondentPetitioner and respondentThe petitioner asks a reviewing court to act; the respondent answers that request.Learn more about petitioner and respondent →. With him on the brief were Deborah S. Swettenam and Alan Morrison. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. A defendant convicted of a federal crime has a right under 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b) to receive credit for certain time spent in official detention before his sentence begins. In this case, we must decide whether the District Court calculates the credit at the time of sentencing or whether the Attorney General computes it after the defendant has begun to serve his sentence. 503us2$50N 02-19-99 09:45:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 503 U. S. 329 (1992) 331 Opinion of the Court I In the summer and early fall of 1988, respondent Richard Wilson committed several crimes in Putnam County, Tennes- see. The precise details of these crimes do not concern us here. It suffices to state that Tennessee authorities ar- rested Wilson on October 5, 1988, and held him in jail pend- ing the outcome of federal and state prosecutions. After certain preliminary proceedings, Wilson eventually pleaded guilty to various federal and state criminal charges. On November 29, 1989, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee sentenced Wilson to 96 months’ imprisonment for violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1951. The District Court denied Wilson’s request for credit for time served during his presentence state cus- tody. On December 12, 1989, a Tennessee trial court sen- tenced Wilson to several years’ imprisonment for robbery and two other felonies. In contrast to the District Court, the state court granted Wilson 429 days of credit toward his state sentence. Later that day, Tennessee authorities transferred Wilson to federal custody, and he began serving his federal sentence. Wilson appealed the District Court’s refusal to give him credit for the time that he had spent in state custody. Revers- ing the District Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Wilson had a right to credit and that the District Court should have awarded it to him. 916 F. 2d 1115 (1990). We granted certiorariCertiorariDiscretionary Supreme Court review requested through a petition.Learn more about certiorari →, 502 U. S. 807 (1991), and now reverse. II The Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), has responsibility for imprisoning federal offenders. See 18 U. S. C. § 3621(a). From 1966 until 1987, a provision codified at 18 U. S. C. § 3568 (1982 ed.) required the Attorney General to award federal prisoners credit for certain time…